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INTRODUCTION

S

ince the early 1900s, belligerents have established maritime zones during
armed conflict to control access to broad ocean areas and to shape battlespace management. Regardless of their label—exclusion zone, restricted
area, operational zone, war zone—all zones have a common purpose—to
control or prohibit access of foreign ships and aircraft into the zone.
As part of its war effort in Ukraine, Russia has established restricted areas
that affect freedom of navigation of foreign-flag shipping in both the Black
Sea and the Sea of Azov. The legality of such zones depends largely on the
function of the zone and the enforcement measures applied by the belligerents to vessels and aircraft that enter the zone.
II.

RUSSIAN EXCLUSION ZONES

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federal Agency for Maritime and River
Transport (Rosmorrechflot) announced that “due to a warning received
from the Russian Defense Ministry’s Black Sea Fleet amid the beginning of
antiterrorist operations . . . on February 24, navigation in the Sea of Azov
was suspended until further notice.” 1 The following day, Russia declared a
maritime zone to prohibit navigation in the northwest portion of the Black
Sea north of 45° 21’ “due to counterterrorist operations carried out by the
Russian Navy” and that any ship or vessel “in this area will be regarded as
terrorist threats.” 2
Russia’s decision to establish maritime exclusion/war zones (MEZs) in
the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea is not a novel method of warfare. MEZs
have been routinely employed during armed conflicts since the beginning of
the twentieth century, most recently by the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas War, by Iran and Iraq during the
Tanker War, and by the United States during the First and Second Gulf

1. Fatima Bahtić, Russian Navy’s Operations Restrict Shipping in Sea of Azov Amid Conflict
with Ukraine, NAVALTODAY.COM (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.navaltoday.com/2022/02/24/russian-navys-operations-restrict-shipping-in-sea-of-azov-amid-con
flict-with-ukraine/.
2. Message from Duty Officer, Navigation Warning Service, Dep’t of Navigation and
Oceanography, Russia, https://gcaptain.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Russian-gm
dss-warning.jpg (last visited Aug. 29, 2022).
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Wars. 3 Whether and to what extent these zones are consistent with the law
of naval warfare depends on their function and the measures used by the
belligerents to enforce them. 4
III.

THE FUNCTION OF MARITIME ZONES

MEZs have been used in the past to warn vessels and aircraft to avoid an
area of naval operations, which reduces the possibility that neutral vessels
will be mistakenly identified as a military objective and attacked. 5 To the extent MEZs serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft away from belligerent
activities, thereby reducing their exposure to collateral damage and incidental
injury, and to the extent they do not unreasonably interfere with legitimate
neutral commerce or create a “free fire zone,” the United States believes they
are lawful. 6
In other words, a merchant ship, neutral or enemy, does not become a
lawful target simply because it has entered the MEZ. Before attacking ships
in the MEZ, belligerents must still ensure that they are legitimate military
objectives. 7 Thus, while a MEZ may help to sort neutral and enemy ships,
the same rules of the law of armed conflict apply inside and outside the zone.
Moreover, the extent, location, and duration of a MEZ and the measures
used to enforce the zone should not exceed what is required for military
necessity. 8 Neutral vessels and aircraft must also be guaranteed safe passage
through the MEZ if the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to
neutral ports, although they are subject to the belligerent’s right of visit and
search as explained below. 9

3. See MARITIME OPERATIONAL ZONES app. C (Dennis Mandsager et al. eds., 2013),
https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Stockton%20Ce
nter%20International%20Law/2013-Zones-Manual.pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=sWrSUKeqZaEKhaVvWPx0bCSByt6FQnC6k3YHkszLx9I%3D.
4. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 13.9 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
5. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS app. A (2017) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
6. Id. § 7.9.
7. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 4, § 13.9.2.
8. Id. § 13.9.4.
9. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 7.9.
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War zones declared by Iran and Iraq during the Tanker War were, in
effect, “free fire zones” where no distinction was made between military objectives and protected vessels, thereby violating the principle of distinction.
Iraq indicated it would “attack all vessels” appearing in the zone and that all
tankers, regardless of flag, docking at Kharg Island would be considered legitimate targets. 10 Likewise, Iran declared that all its waters were a war zone
and that it would “bear no responsibility for merchant ships” entering the
Persian Gulf and failing to comply with the routing instructions. The declaration of these zones was impermissible given that it authorized attacks on
neutral merchant ships that simply ventured into the zone. 11
Similarly, during the Falklands/Malvinas War, both Argentina and the
U.K. declared legally questionable exclusion zones. Argentina threatened to
attack any British vessel in its declared war zone, which extended to the entire South Atlantic. 12 The U.K. “total exclusion zone” (TEZ) was equally
problematic. The U.K. declared any military or civilian ship or aircraft, regardless of flag found within the TEZ without the permission of the U.K.
Ministry of Defense would “be regarded as operating in support of the illegal
occupation” of the Falklands and would “be regarded as hostile” and liable
to attack by British Forces. 13
Despite its apparent overreach, however, the TEZ was located away
from the main shipping lanes in the South Atlantic and was of relatively short
duration. Arguably, the TEZ was designed to support British military operations in the Falklands by facilitating the identification of legitimate military
targets rather than target all contacts in the zone. In this regard, the British
declaration indicated that ships or aircraft within the zone were warned of
possible attacks and there is no evidence that foreign-flag vessels within the
TEZ were actually attacked by British forces.
Compare these zones with the Maritime Safety Zone (MSZ) established
by U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in March 2003 (HYDROLANT 597/03). The MSZ warned all ships that U.S. forces were “conducting combat operations in international waters that pose a hazard to navigation” and advised all ships to “remain clear” of the designated operation
area. The United States declaration further advised all vessels to “maintain a
safe distance from U.S. forces,” noting that any vessel entering the MSZ and
approaching U.S. forces or whose intentions were unclear were subject to
10. MARITIME OPERATIONAL ZONES, supra note 3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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visit and search, and that vessels approaching U.S. forces should maintain
radio contact via Channel 16. Non-compliance with these instructions would
authorize “appropriate measures in self-defense if warranted by the circumstances.” 14
The MSZ served as a warning to commercial shipping to stand clear of
the immediate area of operations to reduce the risk of exposure to an inadvertent attack but made clear it was not a free fire zone and that self-defense
measures would only be employed by U.S. forces “if warranted by the circumstances.” Experience shows that most legitimate merchant ships will
avoid a declared exclusion zone and comply with any established restrictions.
Furthermore, merchant shipping typically observes warning areas, which are
widely disseminated by industry groups and insurance entities, known as P&I
(protection and indemnity) clubs. Therefore, the presence of an unknown
contact may be probative in assessing its status and hostile intentions.
IV.

MARITIME ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

Belligerents enforcing these maritime zones must comply with the law of
naval warfare. This body of law restricts enforcement measures differently
with respect to enemy merchant vessels and neutral merchant vessels.
A. Enemy Merchant Vessels
Belligerents may capture enemy merchant ships anywhere outside neutral
waters for adjudication as prize. Enemy merchant ships operating within or
outside the MEZ may not, however, be attacked or destroyed unless the
vessel:
(1) persistently refuses to heave to after being ordered to do so;
(2) actively resists visit and search or capture;
(3) sails under convoy of enemy warships;
(4) is armed with weapons systems beyond that required for self-defense
against criminal threats;

14. Id.
530

Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts

Vol. 99

(5) is incorporated into, or assists in any way, the enemy’s military intelligence system;
(6) acts in any capacity as an enemy naval or military auxiliary; or
(7) is integrated into the enemy’s war-fighting/war-supporting/war-sustaining effort. 15
In destroying enemy merchant vessels, belligerents must first place passengers, crew, and the ship’s papers in a place of safety, unless an enemy
merchant ship persistently refuses to stop when ordered to do so or actively
resists visit and search or capture. 16 This requirement does not apply, however, if under the circumstances at the time of the attack, the warship would
be subject to imminent danger or would otherwise be precluded from accomplishing its mission. 17
There have been no reports of Ukrainian merchant vessels being attacked at sea. However, Russia claims that two Russian-flagged merchant
ships—the ore/oil carrier SGV Flot and the general cargo ship Seraphim Sarovskiy—were hit by Ukrainian missiles in the Sea of Azov on February 24,
2022. 18 Although the attack has not been verified by independent sources,
the Russian Federal Security Services alleged the missiles were fired from
Mariupol in response to the Russian invasion. A fire broke out on board the
SGV Flot and a member of the crew was injured. Both ships returned to
ports in the Sea of Azov. Absent evidence that these merchant ships were
engaged in intelligence collection, were employed as a naval auxiliary, or were
integrated into Russia’s war-fighting, war-supporting, or war-sustaining effort, the missile attack would be inconsistent with the law of naval warfare.

15. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 8.6.2.2.
16. Procès-verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set Forth in Part IV of
the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930 (Nov. 6, 1936), INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=
openDocument&documentId=C103186F0C4291EEC12563CD00519832.
17. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 8.6.2.2.
18. Russia Claims Two Commercial Ships Hit by Ukrainian Missiles, INSURANCE MARINE
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2022), https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/russiaclaims-two-commercial-ships-hit-by-ukrainian-missiles/.
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B. Neutral Merchant Vessels
A neutral merchant ship that enters the MEZ is subject to the belligerent
right of visit and search by Russian and Ukrainian warships to determine the
enemy character of the ship or its cargo, but it may not be captured or attacked unless it engages in certain prohibited conduct. A neutral merchant
ship may be captured if it:
(1) avoids an attempt to establish identity;
(2) resists visit and search;
(3) carries contraband;
(4) breaches or attempts to breach a blockade;
(5) presents irregular or fraudulent papers; lacks necessary papers; or destroys, defaces, or conceals papers during a visit and search;
(6) violates regulations established by a belligerent within the immediate
area of naval operations;
(7) carries personnel in the military or public service of one of the belligerents; or
(8) communicates information in the interest of one of the belligerents. 19
If a neutral merchant ship resists capture, belligerent warships may use
force to compel compliance. Neutral merchant ships may also be attacked
or captured if they take a direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy
or if they act in any capacity as an enemy naval or military auxiliary. 20 Similarly, neutral merchant ships can be captured or attacked if they operate directly under the control, orders, charter, employment, or direction of the
enemy or resist an attempt to establish their identity, including resisting visit
and search. 21
19. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 7.10.
20. Id. ¶ 7.5.1.
21. Id. ¶ 7.5.2.
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There have been numerous independent reports of neutral merchant
ships being attacked in the Black Sea without warning. It is unlikely that these
attacks originated from the Ukraine, but rather were most likely conducted
by Russian warships of the Black Sea Fleet. The first reported attack occurred on February 24, 2022. The Turkish-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged,
bulk carrier M/V Yasa Jupiter suffered significant damage to the bridge and
deck area after it was hit by a missile fifty nautical miles south of Odessa
while en route to Romanian waters. 22 The incident prompted the Republic
of the Marshalls Islands Maritime Administrator to issue a ship security advisory warning vessels:
• To avoid any transit or operation within the exclusive economic zone
of Ukraine or Russia within the Black Sea.
• That access to the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait is blocked by
Russian forces.
• That all Ukrainian ports are closed and that ships may not enter or
leave port.
• That access to northwest Black Sea, north of 45° 21’ has been restricted by the Russian Navy and that transit in this area should be avoided.

To ensure their automatic identification system (AIS) is always transmitting.
•

•

To comply fully with instructions if hailed by military vessels.

•

To not embark armed security personnel while operating in the Black

Sea. 23

The following day, February 25, the Japanese-owned, Panamanianflagged, bulk carrier M/V Namura Queen, which was en route to the port of
Pivdennyi (Yuzhniy) to load grain, was seriously damaged when it was struck
22. Maritime Administrator, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Ship Security Advisory
No. 02-22 (Rev. 9), Geopolitical Conflict—Ukraine, Black Sea, Sea Of Azov (Aug. 10,
2022), https://www.register-iri.com/wp-content/uploads/SSA-2022-02.pdf.
23. Id.
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by a missile at the port’s outer anchorage. 24 A fire broke out on the ship and
at least two crew members were injured. A second Panamanian-flagged bulk
carrier, the M/V Lord Nelson, suffered minor damages after being hit by a
missile while at anchor. 25 That same day, the Moldovan-flagged bunker
tanker M/V Millenium Spirit was also hit by a missile while it was in international waters in the Black Sea, forcing the crew to abandon ship after the
vessel caught fire. 26 Two crew members, including the master, were in critical
condition.
Two additional attacks were reported on March 2, 2022. The Estonianowned, Panamanian-flagged, general cargo ship M/V Helt was hit by a missile sixteen nautical miles southeast of Odessa. 27 Six crew members were rescued but the ship sank. Earlier that day, the Bangladesh-flagged bulk carrier
M/V Banglar Samriddhi was hit by a missile in the port of Olvia south of Mykolaiv, killing one of its twenty-nine crew members. 28
There is no indication that any of these vessels were engaged in activities
that would render them subject to capture or attack by either of the belligerents. Therefore, these indiscriminate attacks (purportedly by Russia) on neutral shipping do not comport with the law of naval warfare, in particular the
principle of distinction.
V.

CONTROL OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

MEZs should not be confused with a belligerent’s right to control the immediate area of naval operations, which is defined as the “area within which
hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating.” 29 To
ensure proper battlespace management and force protection objectives, a
24. Julia Payne, Cargo Ship Namura Queen Hit by Rocket off Ukraine—Local Agent, REUTERS
(Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cargo-ship-namura-queen-hitby-rocket-off-ukraine-local-agent-2022-02-25/.
25. Russian Ship Fires on Sanzhiyka, Then Announces “Security Guarantees” for Passage of Ships,
UKRINFORM (Mar. 25, 2022), https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3439809-russianship-fires-on-sanzhiyka-then-announces-security-guarantees-for-passage-of-ships.html.
26. Xavier Vavasseur, Two Civilian Vessels Hit by Russian Missiles off Odessa—Ukraine MoD,
NAVALNEWS (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/twocivilian-vessels-hit-by-russian-missiles-off-odessa-ukraine-mod/.
27. One Killed as Two Cargo Ships Hit by Explosions off Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 3,
2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/two-cargo-ships-hit-by-explosions-ar
ound-ukraine-one-killed.
28. Id.
29. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 7.8.
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commander may restrict the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft within
the immediate vicinity of naval units and, if required by military necessity,
may prohibit their entry into the area altogether.
This includes control over the communications (except legitimate distress communications) of neutral merchant ships and civil aircraft if those
communications might endanger or jeopardize the success of the operation.
Merchant ships and civil aircraft that fail to conform to a commander’s restrictions may be considered to have acquired enemy character and may be
liable to attack or capture. 30 A commander may not, however, exercise this
right to close off access to a neutral State or to close an international strait
to neutral shipping, unless a route of similar convenience is available to neutral commerce.
It appears that the Russian Navy may have employed this authority in
the northwestern Black Sea. On February 26, it was reported that Russian
naval vessels had used VHF Channel 16 to notify all merchant vessels that it
was conducting a “counterterrorist operation” and demanded all ships located in the Odessa and Danube areas to proceed immediately to the Bosporus. 31 It appears from the interactive map on the Marine Traffic website that neutral shipping has complied with the demand and cleared the
area. 32
VI.

CONCLUSION

The use of MEZs is not prohibited by the law of naval warfare. To the extent
MEZs are used to warn neutral vessels and aircraft to reduce their exposure
to collateral damage and incidental injury and are enforced consistent with
the relevant principles of the law of armed conflict, they are a lawful method
of naval warfare. Russia must, therefore, ensure that the extent, location, and
duration, as well as the measures employed to enforce the zones, do not
exceed what is required by military necessity. In any event, Russia may not
treat a MEZ as a free fire zone and must apply the principle of distinction to
ensure that any ship or aircraft engaged in the zone, regardless of flag, is a
30. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 4, § 13.8.2.
31. Tayfun Ozberk, Russia-Ukraine Conflict: What Happened in the Black Sea So Far?, NAVALNEWS (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/russiaukraine-conflict-what-happened-in-the-black-sea-so-far/#:~:text=On%20February%2026
%2C%20a%20Turkish,proceed%20immediately%20to%20the%20Bosphorus.
32. See Live Map, MARINE TRAFFIC, https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/
centerx:36.1/centery:44.7/zoom:6 (last visited Aug. 29, 2022).
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legitimate military objective. The declared MEZs may also not intentionally
and unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce in the Black
Sea.
On March 11, 2022, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
proposed that the parties to the conflict establish a “blue safe maritime corridor” to allow for the safe evacuation of neutral ships and their crews from
the high-risk areas in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. 33 Russia has agreed with
the proposal and has informed the IMO that it will establish a humanitarian
corridor on March 27 to ensure safe passage for merchant vessels from the
Ukrainian ports of Chernomorsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Ochakov, Odessa,
and Yuzhne. 34 The maritime traffic lane is eighty miles long and three miles
wide, beginning at an assembly area just outside the Ukrainian territorial sea
southeast of Odessa and continuing to the south to an exit area in international waters. Moscow has indicated that the corridor will remain open daily
from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. and has requested Ukrainian authorities “to provide
for the safety and security of the merchant vessels and their crews transiting
to the assembly area.”
The proposal appears to be consistent with Russia’s obligation to ensure
neutral vessels are guaranteed safe passage through the established MEZ in
the northwest Black Sea. However, there has been no response from the
Ukrainian side on whether ships will be allowed to leave Ukrainian ports.

33. IMO, IMO Council Decisions on Black Sea and Sea of Azov Situation (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/ECSStatement.aspx.
34. See IMO, Circular Letter No. 4543, Communication from the Government of the Russian
Federation (Mar. 28 2022), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/Black%20Sea%20and%20Sea%20of%20Azov%20-%20Member%20
States%20and%20Associate%20Members%20Communications/Circular%20Letter%20
No.4543%20-%20Communication%20From%20The%20Government%20Of%20The%
20Russian%20Federation%20(Secretariat).pdf.
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